Determinism and Free Will - Part 1 of 3
I'm going to teach a class on the Philosophy of Science next year
and one of the topics I plan on discussing is Free Will. I've been
studying a bit and thought a blog post might help me organize what I've learned
so far (mostly summarizing A
Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, by Robert Kane).
Determinism is the idea that a given state of a system
will always evolve to a unique subsequent state, and that a given state came
from a unique previous state. This idea is at the heart of Newtonian
mechanics and is why we can predict a future state given enough information
about the present state. It's also fundamental to Information Theory and
the Law of Conservation of Information. Quantum Mechanics throws
Determinism for a loop with its probabilistic nature, but depending on the
interpretation of QM, it can still be considered deterministic. Even if
QM is not deterministic, it replaces determinism with randomness, which doesn't
do much to help Free Will.
Free Will is not so easy to pin down. Some say
that it is simply having your actions align with your desires while others say
that it is the ability to influence your desires and actions. These
distinction (and some more subtle ones) are important to some arguments, but
for now let’s just think of Free Will as being an agent that is capable of
influencing the world, that we are the ultimate source of our actions.
Now to the schools of thought:
1. Compatibilists see no conflict between Determinism and
Free Will (adherents include the Stoics, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mills).
They argue that you always do what you will or desire, so even if that
will was determined, you should not consider yourself any less free because of
it.
You can be a
Compatibilist and not believe that Determinism is true, you would just agree
that if it were true it would not negate Free Will. But most
Compatibilists do believe that Determinism is true, and this group of thinkers
are known as Soft Determinists.
2. Libertarians (not related to the political meaning, at
least not directly) are Incompatibilists who do not believe that Determinism
(Kant is the most well-known adherent). This is the attempt to explain a
deeper meaning of freedom than what the Compatibilists describe, one where a
system in a given state could become more than one subsequent state depending
on the action of an agent (the freedom, I think, that we all seem to
experience). Defending their position is two-fold: 1) showing that Free
Will is incompatible with Determinism and 2) showing that Free Will is
compatible with Indeterminism.
Most agree that
the type of Free Will that Libertarians defend is not compatible with
Determinism, so the arguments typically address showing the compatibility of
Free Will with Indeterminism. The criticism is that mechanistic processes
are obviously determined, so that leaves mental processes. Let's say that
you go to lunch and debate between ordering a hamburger or a chicken sandwich,
but ultimately order a chicken sandwich. A Libertarian would argue that
you could've chosen either, but how could the exact history (experiences,
thoughts, etc.) that lead you to prefer the chicken sandwich on that specific
occasion ever have led you to order the hamburger? This would require
irrationality as you would choose a hamburger despite a thought process that
led you to prefer a chicken sandwich. Now it could be that your thought
process lead to no preference whatsoever, each option was equally satisfactory.
In that case, say the skeptics of Libertarianism, your choice would be
random, which is hardly a satisfactory exercise of Free Will.
Libertarians mount
several defenses, but all of them invoke some sort of mysterious ability that
acts outside of physical law. Kant argues that science could never
explain libertarian free will (scientists agree), but that "such a free
will was presupposed by our practical reason, and, in particular, by our
moral life" (Kant, Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals). If one accepts that people have moral
responsibilities or even the ability to deliberate on a decision, then one has
to accept libertarian free will, even if the explanation is elusive. Kant
agrees that the physical world is Deterministic, but argues that Free Will
emerges from the metaphysical.
3. Hard
Determinists hold
that Determinism is true and Free Will in nothing but an illusion. One of
their arguments against libertarian free will is that it would require you to
be a causa sui, your own
cause. The idea is that your actions are the result of who you are, but
if you didn't create yourself you aren't ultimately responsible for who you
are. Libertarians counter that even if you didn't create yourself, you
are free to influence how you develop. Hard Determinists reply that if
events are determined, then how we were in the past determines any changes to
yourself, and that even if events were undetermined then any changes would be
random (since they reject the metaphysical).
Most Hard
Determinists argue that this realization should change our criminal justice system
from one of punishment to one of deterrence. Derk Pereboom makes the
analogy that criminal punishment should be seen as a quarantine..with the goal
of protecting the population rather than punishing those who weren't ultimately
responsible for their actions.
Just as criminals
aren't criminals of their own volition, neither are desirable characteristics
and achievements ascribable to the individual. Yet, "most everyday
life-hopes would remain," says Hard Determinist Ted Honderich.
"Even if our behavior is determined, we cannot know in advance how
things are destined to turn out. So we must go on trying to realize our
life-hopes and dreams in the same manner as we would if we did believe we had
free will in the incompatibilist sense, though in fact we do not" (Kane, p
74).
End of summary, beginning of opinion:
I've taken a few courses in philosophy
(three to be exact), but I'll admit that many of the subtleties of these
arguments are above my pay grade. I basically have issues with all three
schools of thought, but certainly don't have anything better to propose.
Compatibilism seems to be a bit of a cop
out - we have a semblance of freedom and that is all we should want.
Libertarians basically admit they can't give
a precise explanation of how Free Will intersects with the physical world.
I do believe in the spiritual, but I'm not sure that things spiritual lie
outside of physical laws.
I find Hard Determinism to be the tightest
argument, but I can't comprehend how it doesn't lead to Fatalism. I was
disappointed by their apparent failure to "walk the walk." Hard
Determinists don't want to hold criminals responsible for their actions, but
they want to hold societies responsible for their treatment of criminals.
How can one argue that we don't have choice but then give advice on the
choices we should make in light of that realization? Hard Determinists need to show why people should hope and dream, rather than just saying that they
should. I question whether Hard Determinists have fully convinced
themselves of their position.
Comments
Why do you believe in the spiritual? If the spiritual lies within physical laws, shouldn't you be able to test for it and detect its presence? What are your thoughts on the physical (and geographical) relationship between the spirit/spiritual and the brain?
On the Free Will/Determinism schools of thought, I would like to pick your brain on the validity of the arguments for each position, independent of your feelings on what the consequences would be if the position were true. I think you may have mixed the two at times. Also, I think the failure of the hard determinism proponents to produce a sound logical syllogistic 'therefore' does not reflect well on them, but doesn't necessarily weaken the argument for hard determinism itself.
I think attempting to derive an ought from an is is always problematic and leads to chasing your own tail. Saying that people should hope and dream appears to be an obvious smuggling-in of pre-existing values, rather than something that follows any path which connects to determinism. But even the seemingly more relevant criminal justice prescriptions don't hold up to scrutiny. Like you pointed out, why should an individual be absolved of accountability, but a society (a group of individuals) not be? Why is it fair to quarantine a criminal who is not responsible for his actions, in order to protect a population of people who are equally not responsible for their non-criminal behavior? If we all behave in ways which are determined by coincidences of genes, environment, etc. which were out of our power to choose, how is it fair that any one individual 'deserves' to be free while another does not? And why should we not punish people for actions that are not their fault anyhow?
As far as I can tell, shoulds don't come from facts or learned knowledge, they come from stated goals or existing values. Example: Frank and Joe learn that grass grows faster on the north side of their houses than on the south. Frank and Joe should plant grass on the north side of their houses. This does not necessarily follow. However, if Frank wants to grow as much grass as he can to feed his goats, and Joe wants to mow the lawn as infrequently as possible, it then follows that Frank should plant grass on the north side, and Joe on the south side.
I see hard determinism, if true, as analogous to the knowledge that grass grows faster on the north side of the house in the example. You can use the knowledge to better accomplish your goals, which have been derived from a pre-existing structure of values, but you can't logically derive your goals or values or 'shoulds' from gained knowledge about how the universe works.
If true, hard determinism cannot logically inform or warrant any changes in people's behavior. It does not justify extra efforts to hope or dream, nor does it validate defeatism or criminal behavior with no concern for consequences. These behavioral changes would require a change in the values or goals of a society or individual, not an increase in knowledge or understanding. That would be like stating that Joe should want to mow his lawn more often because he learned that grass grows faster on the north side.
Hard Determinists would do better to avoid giving advice on the choices which ought to be made by the choice-less, because while they may have plenty of opinions on how societies and individuals should best conduct themselves, when they try to derive prescriptions from determinism, there really is no walk to walk.
“I would like to pick your brain on the validity of the arguments for each position, independent of your feelings on what the consequences would be if the position were true. I think you may have mixed the two at times.”
I most certainly did, and I think those claiming the ability to do otherwise are deluding themselves. Kuhn argues in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (and I agree) that aparadigmatic analyses are impossible. Since we all work within a given paradigm our conclusions are necessarily colored accordingly.
My guess is that you feel that my religiousness plays too large a role in my analysis at times, and that may be so, yet I think many of my conclusions would be similar if I were a non-religious person who nevertheless felt that there is meaning and purpose in life.
Given that I can’t see the difference between Hard Determinism and Fatalism (I’ll return to that later), if I’m to make sense of having a purposeful life I would gravitate towards Compatibilism or Libertarianism. I don’t know that a religious viewpoint has too much bearing on Compatibilist arguments (By the way, the arguments that I’ve summarized are more specifically known as Classical Compatibilism. There are some New Compatibilist arguments that I find more compelling that I’ll share when I’ve finished studying them.), though it certainly does on Libertarian ones. But all I’ve said is that as a religious person, I’m not as inclined to throw out all metaphysical explanations as I would be if I were a non-religious person. Aside from that I’m not sure that my analysis would be significantly different.
And just in case you’re concerned, you should know that any opinions I would share in a classroom setting would be measured and minimal for a variety of reasons.
“Why do you believe in the spiritual?”
The short, and possibly most accurate, answer is that I believe in the spiritual because I choose to. I have experienced thoughts and emotions that I choose to interpret as spiritual manifestations. My religion is also a rich source of purpose and meaning in my life. Do I ever question that choice? Yes. Are there social factors that at times influence that choice? Yes again. But it is a choice that I am comfortable with and one that I continue to actively make.
I’ll say a qualified maybe. I believe that God operates through physical laws, but I don’t think that humanity would ever be at the point where they could conduct a scientific experiment where they could confirm or deny the existence of God. That stance is obviously influenced by the view that God intends it that way (i.e. one of the purposes of life is to walk by faith).
I can see how an atheist would take this as completely ad hoc at best, but I also feel that many people of extremely overconfident in their grasp of reality. Given that there are known particles that have almost no interaction with other matter (neutrinos fly through the entire earth as if it weren’t there, including hundreds of thousands that go through you every second) and that most of the universe is dark matter and energy (akin to saying “Here be dragons”), do we really have any idea of the true nature of reality? Certainly not enough to definitively rule out the possibility of some sort of spiritual matter.
And much of science on the fringes is not much more founded. String theory, multiverses, etc., not to mention much of the social sciences, are largely based on unscientific speculation, significantly influenced by the paradigm/goals of the person involved.
It’s not simply that there are enough unknowns in science that there is still room for God. I’m not a proponent of God in the Gaps arguments. Hume argued that science always has to resort to “unexplained explainers” and some today would say that we have since explained the unexplained explainers. Others (myself included) say that any new explainer explainers are themselves unexplained, so we’ve just gone down another layer. There is no bottom, no ultimate explainer. To me there is a parallel with Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem, which proved that any sufficiently powerful system of logic has to be based on unprovable axioms.
This line of reasoning makes it hard for me to see how science can lead to meaning in life. I choose to have God as my source of meaning.
“What are your thoughts on the physical (and geographical) relationship between the spirit/spiritual and the brain?”
Other than a tradition of seeing the spirit as being in close proximity with the body, I really have no idea.
I’ll address the rest of your questions in another comment.
One could make a utilitarian argument that the arrangement that minimizes the aggregate suffering of the masses might include incarcerating a portion of the population. The motivation wouldn’t be punishment, so fault wouldn’t enter the calculus.
“I see hard determinism, if true, as analogous to the knowledge that grass grows faster on the north side of the house in the example. You can use the knowledge to better accomplish your goals, which have been derived from a pre-existing structure of values, but you can't logically derive your goals or values or 'shoulds' from gained knowledge about how the universe works.”
I completely agree with this (and I like your grass example), though I can see why it would be hard for a philosopher to resist making recommendations as they are often accused of being detached from reality.
“If true, hard determinism cannot logically inform or warrant any changes in people's behavior. It does not justify extra efforts to hope or dream, nor does it validate defeatism or criminal behavior with no concern for consequences.”
So here’s where I’m currently stuck with hard determinists. If you grant that criminals are not responsible for their actions (which, from what I gather, they basically all do), then how do you say that anyone is responsible for anything? And if one does not believe one is responsible for one’s actions, how could that not affect their behavior? Though I guess if determinism is true, there is no such thing as changing behavior, there is just unfolding of determined state after determined state.
Furthermore, I am not convinced that determinism does not imply fatalism (though many philosophers are). I found and article (http://web.mit.edu/holton/www/pubs/determinism&fatalism.pdf) by a philosophy professor at MIT on determinism and fatalism. An excerpt:
"fatalism means that either
If I were to call the doctor I would recover, and
If I were to not call the doctor I would recover
or
If I were to call the doctor I would not recover, and
If I were to not call the doctor I not would recover
will be true. And if one of them is true, then it does indeed seem pointless to call the doctor. Calling the doctor would only be worthwhile if it made a difference to recovery; ideally if recovery were counterfactually dependent upon it, that is, if the following two counterfactuals were true:
If I were to call the doctor I would recover; and
If I were not to call the doctor I would not recover
But the truth of those counterfactuals is quite compatible with determinism. Indeed, the central idea behind determinism is that outcomes are determined causally."
To me determinism would say that whether or not you called the doctor was determined, so whether or not you die was also determined. I guess if fatalism means that certain events will happen regardless of the antecedents then it would be different from determinism. But just because determinism requires events to have causes consistent with the laws of nature and the prior states of the system, that doesn't seem to make the outcomes any less fated.